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Y.

R E. TISDALE,

[1) Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power-As Municipal Affair.
-The levy and collection of taxes by a city having- a charter
is a municipal affair; the power is broad, being limited only
by the charter and the Constitution.
[2] Municipal Corporations-Legislative Control-Municipal Affairs.-A city which has accepted the privilege of autonomous
rule under the Constitution has all powers over municipal
affairs, otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only to clear
and explicit limitations and restrictions contained in the
charter.
[3] Id.-Charter.-A city charter adopted under the home rule
provisions of the Constitution operates not as a grant of
power, but as an instrument of limitation and restriction on
the exercise of power over all municipal affairs which the city
is assumed to possess; and the enumeration of powers does
not constitute an exclusion or limitation.
[4] !d.-Legislative Control-Municipal Affairs.-In respect to
municipal affairs, a city operating- under a home rule charter
[1] Power of city under freeholder's charter over taxes, note,
35 A.L.R. 883. See also Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 33; Am.Jur., Taxation,
§ 147.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 95 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 23; [2, 4] Municipal Corporations, §83(6); [3] Municipal Corporations, §75; [5] Municipal Corporations, § 86; [6, OJ Municipal Corporations, § 78; [7]
Taxation, § 21; [8] Taxation, § 27; [10, 11] Municipal Corporations, § 131; [12] Municipal Corporations, § 131; Taxation, § 21;
[13-16] Taxation, § 457.
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is not subject to general law except as the charter may
provide.
[5] !d.-Legislative Control-Municipal A:ffairs.-The levy of
taxes for city purposes, and the collection, treatment and
disposal of city sewage by a chartered city, are municipal
affairs, and neither may be held to be circumscribed except
as expressly limited by charter provisions.
[6] Id.-Charter-Construction.-All rules of statutory construction as applied to charter provisions are subordinate to the
controlling principle that a city, by accepting the privilege
of autonomous rule, has full control over its municipal affairs
except as clearly and explicitly curtailed by the charter; a
restriction on the exercise of municipal power may not be
implied.
[7] Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power-Local Governing
Bodies.-A chartered city by virtue of its power as such has
power to make a charge for rubbish collection unless it is
expressly denied such power by the charter or Constitution;
specific authority is not required.
[8] !d.-Construction of City Charter.-A city charter provision
that the council, whenever it determines that public interest
requires an expenditure for a municipal purpose which cannot
be provided out of ordinary city revenue, "may" submit to the
voters a proposition providing for a "special tax" or the issuing of bonds, when considered in connection with a related
provision that the total tax rate for any one year "shall not
exceed one per cent of the assessed valuation, unless a special
tax be authorized," referred only to a property tax, and was
not a limitation on the city's power to charge occupants of
buildings for the collection of rubbish.
[9] Municipal Corporations- Charter- Construction.- A city
charter section providing nothing more than a permissivP
method by which rubbish may be required to be removed is
not a limitation on other methods.
[10] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish.-A city has power to pass
police regulations on the subject of rubbish.
[11] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish.-An ordinance of a chartered
city requiring occupants of buildings to pay charges for
rubbish collection, regardless of whether or not they use the
collection service, is valid, there being no restriction in the
Constitution or the city's charter, the benefit being the availability of the collection service to all occupants.
[12] !d.-Police Power-Rubbish: Taxation-Delegation of Taxing
Power-Local Governing Powers.-A city rubbish ordinance
which is both a police and a taxing measure may perform
both functions, taxation and regulation, and it may be upheld
as valid under either or both powers.
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Taxation-Excise Taxes.-A charge for rubbish collection
of property graduated according to the
nature of buildings occupied, when considered as a tax, is
more like an excise tax than any other kind; it is not a
nvnn.P"'t" tax,
!d.-Excise Taxes.-In its modern sense an excise tax is any
tax which does not fall within the classification of a poll tax
or a property tax, and embraces every form of burden not
laid directly on persons or property.
rt5] !d.-Excise Taxes.-A right may be subject to an excise tax
even if the right of occupancy rather than of the accumulation
and use of a collection service is involved, though it is a
right which cannot be prohibited under the Constitution.
[16] !d.-Excise Taxes.-A charge imposed by an ordinance of a
chartered city for rubbish collection against "occupants" of
property graduated according to the nature of buildings occupied may be called an excise tax on such occupants for the
privilege of accumulating rubbish and having available collection service therefor, and is not a tax on their interest in the
property as an occupant or possessor; there is no unjust
classification, and the tax is valid in the absence of any constitutional or charter provision which would invalidate it.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jerold E. vVei1, Judge. Reversed.
Aetions to recover charges imposed by a city ordinance for
rubbish collections. Judgments of dismissal entered after
general demurrers to complaint were sustained with leave to
amend aud failure of plaintiff to amend, reversed.
Henry 1\fcClernan, City Attorney, John H. Lauten, Assistant City Attorney, and Joseph W. Rainville, Deputy City
Attorney, for Appellant.
H.oger Arnebergh, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Bourke
,fones aucl James A. Doherty, Assistant City Attorneys, and
Moses A. Berman, Deputy City Attorney, as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Appellant.
Jack B. Tenney and Cecil W. Collins for Respondents.
CAR'rER, J.-Plaintiff, a chartered city, enacted an orclinauee pertaining to rubbish. It provides that rubbish includes
[14] See Am.Jur., Taxation, § 33.
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combustible and noncombustible material.* Every person
having ''charge or control'' of any place where any rubbish
accumulates shall cause it to be placed in specified receptacles
and shall not permit it to accumulate for over certain periods
of time (combustible - one week ; noncombustible - one
month). The city shall provide for its collection at certain
intervals. No person who pays the "minimum charge for
collection'' shall set out for collection more than a specified
quantity; if additional quantities are to be collected, extra
charge shall be made. By section 8 the city council ''. . .
finds that the periodic collection of rubbish from all places
in the City benefits all occupants of places and premises in
the City . . . and therefore all such occupants are made liable
for the rubbish collection fees prescribed by this ordinance."
(Ordinance 1764, § 8.) There are then set forth a schedule
of "fees" varying according to the nature of the use of
the premises occupied, such as 75 cents per month for "single
family dwellings,'' and a different amount for apartments or
places of business. The fees are added to the electric light
bills of the occupant. Extra charges are made for rubbish
in excess of the amounts specified. ''A fee imposed by .. .
[the] ordinance shall be a civil debt owing to the City .. .
from the occupant of the property receiving the service.''
( § 9 (e).) Compliance with the ordinance necessary to procure the collection and removal thereof shall be a defense
to any prosecution for failure to remove or dispose of rubbish.
A violation of the ordinance shall be a misdemeanor punishable as specified.
The plaintiff city commenced three actions which were considered together on demurrer against each of three persons
for the several months that they had not paid the charge
*Rubbish includes " . . . paper, leaves, Christmas trees, chips, grass,
pasteboard, carpets, clothing, magazines, books, straw, packing material,
barrels, boxes, crates, cartons, rags, furniture and all other similar
articles or materials which will burn by contact with flames of ordinary
temperature which are rejected by the owner or producer thereof as
worthless, or useless, but shall not include 'garbage' as that term is
defined in the ordinance of the City providing for collection thereof,
or materials or quantities thereof determined by the City Manager to be
too large or too hazardous to burn in the City's incinerator. . . . 'Noncombustible Rubbish' shall include ashes, broken glass and crockery
bottles, tin cans and containers, metals, all other similar articles or
materials and not to exceed three (3) cubic feet of non-combustible
building materials which are rejected by the owner or producer thereof
as wo:·thless or useless, and for the purposes of this ordinance shall
include those materials or quantities thereof cletermined by the City
Manager to be too large or too hazardous to burn in the City's incinerator." (Ordinance 1764, § 1.)
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le\'ied by the ordinance. Jt is
that the person named
as defendant
a
residenee in ihe city;
(luring his term of oeeupaney rlcfemlnnt "
the use
and ocenpaney of the said
and the privilege of the
use, acemnnlation, and
of eombustible and noneomhustiblc rubbish and refuse thereon"; that plaintiff's agents
!lave called regularly at the homes of defendant to collect
1·n bbish "to the general benefit of the community at large
in the prevention of nnhea1thfnl conditions, the lessening of
fire hazard and the diminution of tho presence of air pollutaats (smog) in said City." Tho charges nmde under the
ordimuwe have not been paid. There is no allegation that
defem1ants had any rubbish to be colleded or that any was
('olleeted from them. Defendants' general demurrers for
failnre to make such alleg·ations ~were sustained with lrave
to amend but plaintiff failed to amend and judgments of
dismissal of the actions ~~-ere entered. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff (:ontends that the rubbish ordinance is both a
police and taxing measure and valid in both respeets; that
the tax portion does not violate the eity eharter. Defendants
assert that the eharge made against oeenpants is not a valid
tax nor special assessment, property, excise or license tax,
nor is it a proper charge for policr' regulation; that it is for
the serviee of having rubbish removed and tl1ero is no allegation here that any rubbish was removed from their property
by plaintiff. If it is a tax of any kind it is on the oceupancy
of property and beyond the power of the city to levy under
its charter.
No contention is made by plaintiff that it is a property
tax and hence possibly subject to the provisions of the Constitution on property taxation.* Nor is there any contention
tllat it is a special assessmelli levied on property aecording
to the benefits receiVl'd from the ll~(' of the money thereby
mise(1, or Ji<:onse tas: for revrnne or regulation. It is not
elaimed that the charge is for serviees performed, that is,
the eolledion of rubbisl1, inasnnwh as there is no allegation in
the <·~omplaint that any rubbish was eollreted from defendants
and tlw eharge fixed b,\T section 8 of the or(linanee, supra,
applies generally to all oeenpants whether or not rubbish is
('Ollreted, although it is allrged that t1Je service was available
to (lefendants who enjoye(l the privilege of using the premises
*All property in the state shall he taxed in proportion to its value.
(Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 1.)
48 C.2d--4

98

CITY OF GLENDALE

v.

TRONDSEN

f48 C.2d

for the accumulation of rubbish and plaintiff's agent has
regularly called for rubbish at the premises occupied by
defendants.
[1] The levy and collection of taxes by a city having a
charter under our Constitution is a municipal affair. The
power is broad, being limited only by the charter and the
Constitution. (Fox etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, 36 Cal.
2d 136 [222 P.2d 879].) It is said in Ainswor·th v. Bryant,
34 Cal.2d 465, 469 [211 P.2d 564] : "It i~ well settled that
the power of a municipal corporation operating under a freeholders' charter . . . to impose taxes 'for revenue purposes,
including license taxes, is strictly a municipal affair' pur~uant to the direct constitutional grant of the people of the
state (Const., art. XI, § 6; West Coast Advedising Co. v. San
Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 524 [95 P.2d 138] ), and that 'the
restrictions on the exercise of that power ar·e only the limitations and rcstr·ictions appearing in the Constit1dion and in
the charter itself.' (Ibid, p. 526.) So it was said in the
earlier case of Ex parte Brann, 141 Cal. 204, at pages 209210 [74 P. 780], quoting from lVIr. Justice ] 1 ield in United
States v. New Orleans, 98 U.S. 381 [25 L.Ed. 225] : 'A
municipality without the power of taxation would be a body
without life, incapable of acting, and serving no useful purposes .... "\Vhen such a corporation is created, the power of
taxation is vested in it, as an essential attribute, for all
the purposes of its existence, unless its exercise be in express
terms prohibited. For the accomplishment of these purposes,
its authorities, however limited the corporation, must have
power to raise money and control its expenditure.' '' (Emphasis added.) [2] And further: " . . . that by accepting
the privilege of autonomous rule the city has all powers over
municipal affairs, otherwise lawfully exercised, subject only
to the clear and explicit limitations and restrictions contained
in the charter. [3] The charteJ· operates not as a grant of
power·, but as an instrnment of limitation and restriction on
the exercise of powM· over all rnnnicipal affairs which the city
is assumed to possess; and the enumeration of powers does not
constitute an exclusion or limitation. (West Coast Advertising Co. v. San Francisco, 14 Cal.2d 516, 521-522, 525 [95 P.2d
138] alld cases cited; City of Oakland v. Williams, 15 Cal.2d
542, 550 [103 P.2d 168]; San Francisco v. Boyd, 17 Cal.
2d 606, 617-618 [110 P.2d 1036]; Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal.2d
569, 575 [170 P .2d 904] ; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, ante, pp. 31, 37 [34 Cal.2d] [207 P.2d 1]. [4] Thus
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in respect to municipal affairs the city is not subject to general law except as the charter may provide. (Heilbron v.
Sttmner, 186 Cal. 648, 650 [200 P. 409] ; Muehleisen v.
Forward, 4 Cal.2d 17, 19 [46 P.2d 969].) [5] As recognized in the West Coast Advertising case, the levy of taxes
for city purposes is a municipal affair; the collection, treatment and disposal of city sewage and the making of contracts
therefor are likewise municipal affairs (Loop Lumber Co. v.
Van Loben Sels, 173 Cal. 228, 232 [159 P. 600]), and neither
may be held to be ci1·curnscribed except as expressly limited
by the charter provisions. [6] All rttles of statutory constnwtion as applied to charter provisions ... are subordinate
to this controlling principle. The former guide-that municipalities have only the powers conferred and those necessarily incident thereto. . . . A construction in favor of the
exercise of the power and against the existence of any limitation or restriction thereon which is not expressly stated in
the charter is clearly indicated. So guided, reason dictates
that the full exercise of the power is permitted except as
clearly and explicitly curtailed. Thus in construing the city's
charter a restriction on the exercise of municipal power may
not be implied." (Emphasis added; City of Grass Valley v.
Walkinshaw, 34 Cal.2d 595, 598-599 [212 P.2d 894].)
[7] It is not necessary, therefore, that there be specific
authority for the charge (the nature of the charge is discussed later) here levied. By virtue of its power as a
chartered city plaintiff has power to make it unless it is
expressly denied such power by the charter or Constitution.
[8] Defendants assert that there are such limitations in the
charter. Section 12 of article XI thereof provides that whenever the city council determines that public interest requires
an expenditure for a municipal purpose which cannot be
provided out of the ordinary city revenue, it "may" submit
to the voters a proposition providing for a "special tax"
or the issuing of bonds. No election was held for the adoption
of the ordinance in question. This contention is correctly
met by City of Glendale v. Crescenta etc. Water Co., 135
Cal.App.2d 784, 798 [288 P.2d 105], where it is pointed out
that an excise tax may be imposed without a vote as section
12 of article XI referred only to property taxes, the court
stating: ''Respondent asserts a violation of section 12, article XI of the charter, claiming this is a special tax which
is invalid for failure to submit to the electors. That section
must be construed in the light of related provisions. Section
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11 says: 'The total tax rate for any one year shall not
exceed one per cent of the assessed valuation, unless a special
tax be authorized, as provided in this chapter; ... ' .And section 12: 'Whenever the Council shall determine that the
public interest demands an expenditure for municipal purposes, which cannot be provided for out of the ordinary
revenue of the City, it may submit to the qualified voters
at a regular or special election, a proposition to provide for
such expenditure, either by levying a special tax, or by issuing bonds, but no such special tax shall be levied nor any
such bonds issued, unless authorized by the affirmative votes
of two-thirds of the electors voting at such election.' . . .
Sections 9, 10 and 11 are so worded as to refer exclusively
to ad valorem property taxes. Section 11 says in effect that
the basic rate of one per cent of assessed valuation may be
increased to the extent of a special tax voted by the people.
This could mean only a property tax. Section 12 implements
the phrase of 11, 'unless a special tax be authorized, as
provided in this charter; . . .' It does so by submitting
to the voters at a general or special election a proposal to
provide for an expenditure which ordinary revenues cannot
meet-to provide for same 'either by levying a special tax,
or by issuing bonds'; same must be approved by two-thirds
vote. Section 22 of the same article authorizes payment,
at the election of the council, of all or any part of the
Metropolitan tax out of the public service surplus fund.
This was done by amendment in 1941, later than the passage
or amendment of section 11 or section 12. It would be unduly
straining the meaning of section 12 to hold that it requires
a special election to raise funds for any part of the Metropolitan tax which is not to be paid out of the surplus fund.
Section 12 relates only to property taxes."
[9] Defendants also point to section 6 of article XXIII
of the charter.* Obviously this is nothing more than a per*It provides the council may adopt a procedure '' . . . for the improvement of streets, alleys or other public places, or for the removal
of dirt, rubbish, weeds and other rank growths and materials which may
injure or endanger neighboring property or the health or the welfare
of inhabitants of the vicinity, from buildings, lots and grounds and the
sidewalks opposite thereto, and for making and enforcing assessments
against property benefited or affccterl the1·eby or from which such
removal is made, for the cost of such improv~monts or removal, and
may make such assessments a lion on such property superior to all other
claims or lie~ls thereon, except State, County and Municipal taxes, but
no such onlmancc shnll TH'C'Yent tho Council from proceeding under
general laws for said purposes." (Glendale Charter, Stats. 1921, p. 2204
as amended.)
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missive method by which rubbish may be required to be
removed and not a limitation on other methods when we
consider the nature of the power of chartered cities as shown
by the .Ainsworth and \Valkinshaw cases and other cases and
authorities cited therein.
Defendants' chief contention is that the charge made by the
ordinance is not a tax but merely a fee for services rendered
and that since it is not alleged that they received the services, the complaint fails to state a cause of action; that a
charge for services not rendered is invalid presumably as a
taking of property without due process of law.
[10] It is not questioned that provisions with respect to
rubbish are a proper exercise of the police power (see In re
Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328 [81 P. 955]; California Reduction
Co. v. Sanitary Red1wtion Works, 199 U.S. 306 [26 S.Ct. 100,
50 L.Ed. 204] ; In re Pedrosian, 124 Cal..App. 692 [13 P.2d
:>89]; Glass v. City of Fresno, 17 Cal..App.2d 555 [62 P.2d
765]; Ponti v. Burastero, 112 Cal..App.2d 846 [247 P.2d 597];
Davis v. City of Santa Ana, 108 Oal..App.2d 669 [239 P.2d
656]). 'l'he power of the city to pass police regulations on
the subject of rubbish being clear, we must look to see if
there is any constitutional objection to the charge here imposed. The case is analogous to the requirement by a city
that all premises connect with the city sewer system at the
expense of the property owners or making a charge therefor
even though the premises have other adequate sewer facilities.
'!'here is no constitutional objection to such a requirement.
(See Sanitation Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson Cotlnty v. Campbell,
~- Ky. - - [249 S.W.2d 767] ; District of Columbia v.
B1·ooke, 214 U.S. 138 [29 S.Ot. 560, 53 L.Ed. 941] ; Htdchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 [33 S.Ct. 290, 57 L.Ed.
520] ; Farqtthar v. Board of Sttpervisors, 196 Va. 54 [82
S.E.2d 577] ; Fenton v. Atlantic City, 90 N.J.L. 403 [103 .A.
695].) And the same is true of a city water system to which
premises must connect and pay the rates although they have
other water supplies. (Weber City Sanitation Com. v. Craft,
196 Va. 1140 [87 S.E.2d 153] .) It is said in Farquhar v.
Board of Supervisors, 196 Va. 54 [82 S.E.2d 577, 587]:
"Lastly it is contended that the enforcement of sewerage connections, the collection of charges and the creation of a lien
therefor ... may deprive landowners of their property without due process of law. These sections provide that the
owner, tenant or occupant of a parcel of land upon which is a
building for residential, commercial or industrial use, which
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parcel abuts upon a street containing a sanitary sewer which
is part of or served by the sewer system, may be required,
with the consent of the local government, to connect his
building with the sewer and cease to use any other method of
sewage disposal. If the charges for the use of the system
are not paid within 30 days after becoming due, the Authority
may disconnect the premises from the water and/or sewer
system, or otherwise suspend services and recover the amount
due in a civil action . . . .
''Such provisions are necessary implements of a sanitary
system constructed and operated by an agency of the State
which was created and organized for the public good. . . .
We hold the provisions in question to be constitutional as
being a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State
and bearing a substantial relation to the protection and preservation of the public health. 39 C.J.S., Health, § 2, p. 811,
§ 21 at p. 835; 25 Am.Jur., Health, § 3, p. 287. Like provisions have been frequently upheld against the charge of
being an invasion of constitutional rights." [11] In the
instant case the ordinance is in many respects a police measure. Section 8, supra, in effect provides that every occupant
of buildings must pay the charges for rubbish collection which
means that they must pay whether or not they use the collection service. This is, so far as the constitutional question is
concerned, if anything, less stringent than the requirement
that they use the service as held in the authorities, supra,
dealing with sewer and water. In those cases it was held
that a charge could be made for the service even though the
occupants did not want it. In most of those cases the charge
was said not to be a tax but rather a service charge but it is
not important whether, on this phase of the case, it be called
a tax or a service charge; it is justified under the police
power. As long as there is no restriction in the Constitution
or charter the ordinance must be held valid. It is not claimed
that the charge is excessive or discriminatory (a denial of
equal protection), and it appears that a benefit is received
by the occupants of all property as all the probabilities point
to the existence of the accumulation of rubbish described in
the ordinance on all occupied property. The benefit is the
availability of the collection service to all occupants-the
regular service of collection and the right to accumulate rubbish, like the benefit of sewage facilities although the occupant
does not choose to use them. As said in Carson v. Brockton
Sewerage Com., 182 U.S. 398, 405 [21 S.Ct. 860, 45 L.Ed.
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1151] : "Notwithstanrling the former case, we think the court
was correct in holding in this case that the petitioner and other
property owners whose lots abutted on this public sewer did
receive a benefit not common to the inhabitants of the city
generally, in being permitted to discharge into it the contents
of their private sewers, that the amount of such benefit was
determinable by the city council, and that in its action there
was nothing violative of the Federal Constitution." (See
Patterson v. City of Chattanooga, 192 Tenn. 267 [241 S.W.2rl
291]; Sharp v. Hall, 198 Okla. 678 [181 P.2d 972].)
County Corn'rs of Anne Anmdel Cotrnty v. English, 182
Md. 514 [35 A.2d 135], and Rapa v. Haines, (Ohio App.) 101
N.E.2d 733, are not in point as they involved a tax for revenue
purposes.
In the foregoing discussion we have assumed that the charge
for the rubbish collection system is a charge for a service under
the police power and valid as such but it is also valid if
designated as a tax. .As seen, the city has powers of taxation
except as limited by its charter and the Constitutions, state
and federal. [12] While the ordinance has many police
regulations as above shown, there is no obstacle to it performing both functions, taxation and regulation, and it may be
upheld as valid under either or both powers. (See Redwood
Theatres, Inc. v. City of Modesto, 86 Cal..App.2d 907 [196
P.2d 119]; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 [20 S.Ct. 633,
44 !J.Ed. 725] ; Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U.S. 477 [33 S.Ct.
318, 57 L.Ed. 603] .) [13] Considering the charge as a tax,
it is more like an excise tax than any other kind. It is not
a property tax because it is not on an ad valorem basis.
It does not purport to tax property or any interest therein,
possessory or otherwise. The charge is made against "occupants" of property graduated according to the nature of the
buildings occupied. The charge is not against the property.
We do not have, therefore, any question of double taxation or
possible invalidity for a failure to assess it according to
value (see Fox etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 36 Cal.
2d 136). It is similar to an excise tax as it is laid on the
occupant for the accumulation and having available to him
the regular collection of rubbish which may be referred to as
a privilege. [14] It is said: "It is, however, difficult to
arrive at any all-inclusive definition of the term 'excise tax,'
since it has long since been changed from its original connotation of an impost upon a privilege. In its modern sense an
excise tax is any tax which does not fall within the classifica-
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tion of a poll tax or a property tax, and embraces every
form of burden not laid directly upon persons or property."
(51 Am.,Jur., Taxation, § 33.) And: "Taxes fall naturally
into three
namely, capitation or poll taxes, taxes on
property, and excises. In general, it may be said that all
taxes fall into one or the other of the foregoing classes, any
exaction which is elearly not a poll tax or a property tax being
an excise." (Id., § 24.) [15] It should be observed that a
right may be subject to an: excise tax even if the right of
occupancy rather than of the accumulation and use of a collection service is involved, although it is a right which cannot
be prohibited under the Constitution. It is said in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578 [57 S.Ct. 883, 81
L.Ed. 1279, 109 A.L.R. 1293], involving the social security
tax on employers: "\Ve are told that the relation of employment is one so essential to the pursuit of happiness that it may
not be burdened with a tax. Appeal is made to history. From
the precedents of colonial days we are supplied with illustrations of excises common in the colonies. They are said
to have been bound up with the enjoyment of particular commodities. Appeal is also made to principle or the analysis
of concepts. An excise, we are told, imports a tax upon a
privilege; employment, it is said, is a right, not a privilege,
from which it follows that employment is not subject to an
excise. Neither the one appeal nor the other leads to the
desired goal.
''As to the argument from history: Doubtless there were
many excises in colonial days and later that were associated,
more or less intimately, with the enjoyment or the use of property. This would not prove, even if no others were then
known, that the forms then accepted were not subject to
enlargement. [Citations.] But in truth other excises were
known, and known since early times. Thus in 1695 (6 & 7
\Vm. III, c. 6), Parliament passed an act which granted 'to
His Majesty certain Rates and Duties upon Marriage, Births
and Burials,' all for the purpose of 'carrying on the War
Against France with Vigour.' (See Opinion of the Justices,
196 Mass. 603, 609 [85 N.E. 545]. No commodity was affected
there. The industry of counsel has supplied us with an apter
illustration where the tax was not different in substance from
the one now challenged as invalid. In 1777, before our Constitutional Convention, Parliament laid upon employers an
annual 'duty' of 21 shillings for 'every male Servant' employed in stated forms of work. [Citation.] The point is
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made as a distinction that a tax upon the use of male
servants was thought of as a tax upon a luxury. [Citation.]
It did not touch employments in husbandry or business. This
is to throw over the argument that historically an excise is a
tax upon the enjoyment of commodities. But the attempted
distinction, whatever may be thought of its validity, is inapplicable to a statute of Virginia passed in 1780. There a
tax of three pounds, six shillings and eight pence was to be
paid for every male tithable above the age of twenty-one
years (with stated exceptions), and a like tax for 'every white
servant whatsoever, except apprentices under the age of
twenty one years.' [Citation.] Our colonial forebears knew
more about ways of taxing than some of their descendants
seem to be willing to concede.
''The historical prop failing, the prop or fancied prop of
principle remains. 1,Ve learn that employment for lawful
gain is a 'natural' or 'inherent' or 'inalienable' right, and
not a 'privilege' at all. But nat1tral rights, so called, are as
mtwh s1tbject to taxation as rights of less importance. An
excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may be
prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the
outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities
pursued as of common right. . . . Whether the tax is to be
classified as an 'excise' is in truth not of critical importance.
If not that, it is an 'impost.' . . . A capitation or other
'direct' tax it certainly is not. 'Although there have been
from time to time intimations that there might be some tax
which was not a direct tax nor included under the words
''duties, imposts and excises,'' such a tax for more than one
hundred years of national existence has as yet remained undiscovered, notwithstanding the stress of particular circumstances has invited thorough investigation into sources of
powers.' Pollock v. Farmers' Loan&; Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429,
557 [15 S.Ct. 673, 39 L.Ed. 759]. There is no departure
from that thought in later cases, but rather a new emphasis
on it. Thus, in Thornas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370
[24 S.Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481], it was said of the words 'duties,
impost and excises' that 'they were used comprehensively
to cover customs and excise duties imposed on importation,
consumption, mannfacture and sale of certain commodities,
privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occnpations and the like.' '' (Emphasis added.) Such charges
as here involved have been called taxes: ". . . a large part
of the cost of the sewer system of the City of Philadelphia
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was raised by assessments against abutting property owners.
Being imposed without any regard whatever to the extent or
value of the use made of the sewer facilities, or whether any
usc is made, the charge provided for by the ordinance is, in
legal effect, undoubtedly a tax, and the obligation to pay it
could be created only by the City's exercise of its general
taxing power." (In re Petition of City of Philadelphia,
340 Pa. 17 [16 A.2d 32, 35].) And a charge somewhat
analogous to that here involved has been upheld as a valid
excise tax (Bapa v. Haines, (Ohio App.) 101 N.E.2d 733;
affd. 113 N.E.2d 121, involving a fixed tax on auto trailers
used for human habitation). A contrary result was reached
in Cmrnty Com'rs of Anne Arundel County v. English, supra,
182 Md. 514 [35 A.2d 135], but it was based on a denial of
equal protection of the law where a fiat tax was placed on
auto trailers with the wheels off but none on other habitations
and that it was a property tax not based on value. Those
things are not present here. The tax is on the factors mentioned and is not discriminatory. On the contrary, reasonable
dassifications are made.
[16] Since the charge may be called an excise tax on the
occupants of real property for the privilege of accumulating
rubbish and having available collection service therefor and is
thus not a tax on their interest in the property as an occupant
or possessor thereof, and there is no unjust classification, we
find no constitutional or charter provision which invalidates
such a tax.
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
1\feComb, J., concurred.
SHENK, J.-I concur in the opinion and the judgments of
reversal. 'rhe opinion contains a ·well considered discussion
of the subject of municipal affairs as applied to a municipality operating under a freeholder's charter. If the same
consideration had been given to that subject and been applied
in the case of Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal.2cl 852 [806 P.2cl 789],
the judgment in that case would have been affirmed in its
entirety.

